Client Success Story: How PAGO Secured a Financial Institution Under Ransomware Attack

When ransomware infiltrated an ASEAN government agency managing a critical public financial database linked to regional transportation systems, the impact extended beyond temporary system paralysis.

The attackers issued ransom demands while the organization faced a cascade of complications: distributed backup systems across multiple regions had been infected, recovery timelines stretched beyond acceptable parameters, and external audit obligations added pressure to an already critical situation.

The threat had achieved what most organizations fear: simultaneous compromise of production systems and backup infrastructure, effectively eliminating the standard recovery pathway.

Initial Assessment

PAGO Networks' incident response began with immediate collection of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). The forensic team extended analysis beyond visibly infected systems to examine endpoints showing no apparent signs of compromise. This proved consequential. Dark web monitoring uncovered ongoing Indicators of Attack (IOAs) that revealed the initial breach vector and suggested the threat actors maintained persistent access.

The investigation identified 3 critical gaps in the existing security posture:

The IT and OT boundary monitoring had relied on perimeter defenses that failed to detect lateral movement after initial compromise. Network segmentation existed in theory but had been undermined by legitimate business requirements that created unmonitored pathways between systems. Backup infrastructure shared authentication mechanisms with production systems, allowing attackers to move freely between both environments.

Technical Response Architecture

PAGO deployed Stellar Cyber NDR and Open XDR across headquarters and regional facilities as the correlation engine. Rather than treating each location as an isolated environment, the platform aggregated network flows to reconstruct attacker movement across geographic and logical boundaries.

SentinelOne EDR rolled out company-wide provided behavioral analysis at the endpoint level. The combination allowed the security team to identify compromised accounts being used to access systems that appeared normal in isolation but formed part of a coordinated attack chain when viewed holistically.

Attack Surface Management scans identified 17 externally exposed assets that had no business justification for internet accessibility. Several were legacy management interfaces for backup systems. The attackers had used these as secondary access points, explaining why initial containment efforts failed to stop the intrusion.

Automated Response Integration

The response capability centered on PAGO DeepACT, which automated the connection between detection, analyst judgment, and containment action. When Stellar Cyber identified suspicious authentication patterns consistent with credential reuse across backup systems, DeepACT triggered immediate isolation protocols without waiting for manual approval. This removed the time gap that typically allows attackers to recognize they have been detected and escalate their actions.

Threat hunting rules developed during the forensic investigation fed back into the detection engine continuously. Each new IOC or behavioral pattern identified through manual analysis became an automated detection signature within hours, not days or weeks.

Blocking the Second Wave

The attackers attempted a second intrusion using different initial access vectors. The automated detection and response system blocked the attempt at the reconnaissance phase. Network traffic analysis identified scanning patterns targeting the same infrastructure categories that had been vulnerable in the first attack. The system isolated the affected network segments and terminated suspicious processes before the attackers could establish persistence.

Two subsequent attempts followed similar patterns. Both were contained automatically because the threat hunting process had built a comprehensive profile of the adversary's tactics, techniques, and procedures.

From Incident Response to Operational Resilience

The organization transitioned from emergency response mode to continuous security operations by maintaining the MDR framework beyond initial recovery. The 24x7 analyst-driven response system became the permanent model, not a temporary measure.

The national cyber resilience assessment that followed rated the organization at the highest tier. The assessment framework specifically noted the shift from reactive security operations to behavior-based threat hunting that identified potential compromises before they manifested as incidents.

Architecture That Persists

The technical architecture deployed during incident response addressed the fundamental issues that had enabled the ransomware attack:

Network visibility extended to the protocol level across all sites, eliminating the blind spots that had hidden lateral movement. Endpoint telemetry provided behavioral context that revealed malicious activity disguised as legitimate system administration. Attack surface management became a continuous process rather than a periodic audit, ensuring that exposed assets were identified and remediated before attackers discovered them.

The integration of these capabilities through DeepACT meant that detection triggered response without manual intervention while maintaining analyst oversight of critical decisions. This hybrid model addressed the core problem in security operations: automated systems alone generate false positives that erode trust, while manual-only processes cannot match the speed of modern attacks.

Quantifiable Outcomes

Recovery occurred without secondary infections despite the sophisticated nature of the threat. The three post-recovery intrusion attempts were blocked before achieving any level of system access. External audit compliance improved from partial to complete, satisfying regulatory requirements that had been outstanding before the incident.

The financial impact calculation went beyond prevented losses. The organization avoided the compounding costs of extended downtime, regulatory penalties for inadequate security controls, and reputational damage from a public breach of systems managing citizen data.

Technical Lessons

Financial institutions and government agencies managing critical infrastructure face similar threat profiles: nation-state actors or sophisticated criminal groups with resources to conduct patient, multi-stage attacks. The standard enterprise security model built around perimeter defense and signature-based detection cannot address these threats.

The successful defense required three technical elements working in coordination: comprehensive visibility across network and endpoint layers that revealed attacker behavior rather than just malware signatures; correlation analysis that connected activities across systems and time to identify attack campaigns rather than isolated events; and automated response capability that contained threats at machine speed while analysts focused on investigation and hunting.

Organizations that experienced similar ransomware incidents but failed to implement these architectural changes remained vulnerable to reinfection. The threat actors typically returned within weeks using modified tactics that bypassed the specific controls implemented after the first attack. The continuous threat hunting model prevented this pattern by focusing on adversary behavior rather than specific tools or malware.

Operational Model

The MDR service model addressed a constraint common across financial and government sectors: skilled security analysts remain scarce while threats increase in sophistication and volume. The outsourced expertise provided analyst capability equivalent to a mature internal SOC without the multi-year timeline required to build such teams.

The 24x7 operations model proved necessary given that both intrusion attempts after initial recovery occurred outside business hours. Attackers deliberately target periods when security teams operate with reduced staffing, understanding that detection during these windows is less likely and response will be delayed.

The shared intelligence model meant that tactics identified in one client engagement informed threat hunting across the entire customer base. When forensic analysis revealed a specific technique for exploiting backup infrastructure, PAGO deployed detection rules for that behavior to all financial sector clients within 48 hours. Several organizations subsequently identified and blocked similar intrusion attempts that they would not have detected with their existing tools.

Current Security Posture

The organization maintains the enhanced security architecture as the operational baseline. Threat hunting continues to identify potential security gaps before they are exploited. The MDR team conducts quarterly penetration tests that validate detection and response capabilities against evolving attacker tactics.

The security investment model shifted from periodic tool purchases to continuous operational capability. This better aligns spending with the persistent nature of the threat environment, where adversaries constantly develop new techniques and defenses must evolve at similar speed.

For more real-world results and client success stories, read the full report here